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A RIGHT TO PASTIMES? 
This is a problem in constitutional jurisprudence-an exam 
question, if you like. The problem is to find a fatal flaw in the fol-
lowing argument. 
"The Supreme Court should recognize a constitutional right to 
pastimes, protecting Americans against arbitrary and capricious 
state inference with activities as varied as basketball and bird 
watching. Although the concept of such a right is novel, it can be 
justified by standard principles of constitutional jurisprudence: 
1. The text of the Constitution is not the only source of con-
stitutional rights; extratextual sources such as Supreme Court 
precedents, penumbras of the Bill of Rights, and our evolving 
national needs, traditions, and aspirations should also be 
consulted. 
2. The Declaration of Independence is a fundamental part of our 
tradition, embodying as it does our highest collective aspira-
tions. As such, it is a potential source of constitutional rights. 
3. One of the rights enumerated in the Declaration is 'the pursuit 
of happiness.' 
4. Pastimes are essential to happiness. As Pascal maintained, 
humans are not happy without diversions; left to themselves 
even monarchs feel wretched. That is why, notes Pascal, they 
are surrounded by people whose function is to amuse them. 
5. There is, therefore, a constitutional right to pastimes, grounded 
not only in the Declaration, but also in penumbras of the sec-
ond amendment (right to bear arms), and scattered decisions, 
perhaps including Stanley v. Georgia as well as some of the 
other "privacy" decisions under the fourteenth amendment. 
For if conjugal relations are a species of "privacy," then surely 
reading in solitude is also deserving of the label, and if the right 
to possess deadly weapons is protected in at least some circum-
stances-despite strong policy arguments against it-the associ-
ated right to engage in the innocent pastime of angling is 
equally deserving of judicial protection. 
6. The objections to such a right are obvious but misguided. 
While many will regard pastimes as too trivial for judicial pro-
tection, the same may be said of every constitutional right at its 
margin: that freedom. of expression may be construed to in-
clude nude dancing does not gainsay its centrality in the consti-
tutional system; that the establishment clause leads, ultimately, 
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to arguments about the White House Christmas tree does not 
detract from the fundamental nature of the underlying right. 
Similarly, the fact that a right to pastimes may lead to cases 
involving video games does not rebut the importance of the 
core of this right. 
"It is true, no doubt, that the pursuit of happiness is com-
monly thought of as less elevated than the pursuit of liberty and 
equality. We talk as if the Court's role is to promote virtue 
instead of pleasure. But this distinction is vague and difficult to 
defend. Whatever the founders may have believed, in our time 
liberty and equality are esteemed chiefly because, and to the 
extent that, they are thought to be conducive to happiness. 
Even if we reject that commonsensical justification, and rely in-
stead on some sort of natural rights theory, the same theory 
should justify a right to pastimes. Why is the right to buy con-
doms more noble or fundamental than, say, the right to hear 
Beethoven or to play chess? 
"Happiness is the essential foundation of the civilized pol-
ity that constitutional theorists from Publius to Ely have sought 
to achieve, and without which no other constitutional right is 
secure. The right to pastimes can therefore be justified as a nec-
essary adjunct to all of the rights that are explicitly protected by 
the Bill of Rights. For if the people are unhappy, no party, no 
doctrine, no theory of interpretation can prevent their politics 
from being bigoted and mean-spirited. Would a society that 
prohibited dancing and wine be less grim, or less oppressive, 
than one that forbade commercial advertising? 
"This is not to say that all regulations of pastimes are un-
constitutional. The right to pastimes obviously should not be 
treated as a general rule, like religious liberty or freedom of 
speech, with only a handful of carefully-circumscribed excep-
tions. On the contrary, most regulations of pastimes should be 
upheld, simply because they have adequate (or arguably ade-
quate) justifications. This is not inconsistent with the concept 
of a constitutional right. It is what the courts do, in practice if 
not always in theory, under the dormant commerce clause, the 
just compensation clause, the equal protection clause, and the 
right to privacy. All these rights are, in effect, exceptions to a 
general rule that there is no such right. There is no right, for 
example, not to be deprived of profits by government regula-
tion, but in a tiny handful of extreme situations compensation 
must be paid for a "constructive taking." Likewise, there is in 
fact no general rule against government interference with pri-
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vacy, only a few situations in which that interference is thought 
to be so severe and unwarranted that the Court deems it uncon-
stitutional. Most clearly of all, the Constitution permits une-
qual treatment of various classes of people, despite the equal 
protection clause, whenever the government can justify the dis-
crimination, and usually even if the justifications are implausi-
ble. "Denial of equal protection" does not describe a factual 
situation; rather, it is a conclusory label (like "denial of due 
process") that the Court applies in the extremely rare cases in 
which it is willing to invalidate laws that draw unjustifiable 
distinctions. 
"Some may argue that a right to pastimes is unnecessary, 
because by and large the government does not enact blatantly 
unreasonable regulations of pastimes. Even if the premise of 
this argument is correct, the conclusion does not follow. The 
fact that a right is tacitly respected argues for, not against, its 
existence: When Griswold was decided, the right to contracep-
tives was almost universally respected in America; this made 
Connecticut's infringement of the right seem all the more 
outrageous. 
"It is not necessary, and would be foolish, to try to antici-
pate all the laws that should be struck down under this right. 
As with all new constitutional rights, the contours of the right 
to pastimes can be determined gradually, in the traditional 
case-by-case process of constitutional adjudication." 
D.P.B. 
